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ABSTRACT
We investigate whether female presence on firms’ board of commissioners and
board of directors is associated with a higher dividend policy. Using panel data on
525 publicly listed firms in Indonesia between 2011 and 2018, we find that the impact
of females’ presence on firms’ boards on dividend policy depends on their role as
either an executive or a non-executive on the boards. Female directors are negatively
associated with cash dividend payments, while female commissioners are positively
associated with dividend payments in the case of only family-controlled firms. Our
results provide insights into corporate governance practices in a two-tiered board
system in a developing country.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the issue of board gender diversity has attracted great
attention, as indicated by the increasing number of women on corporate boards,
especially in developed countries, such as those in Western Europe (Smith, 2018)
and the US (Solal & Snellman, 2019). Data from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development member countries on the proportion of women
on the boards of the largest listed companies show an increasing trend across
countries.1 Studies have shown that gender diversity has a substantial role in
corporate policies that positively value organizational performance. Female
members of boards of directors (BODs) tend to be more active in attending company
meetings, obey rules and laws, are more sensitive to ethical issues, take different
perspectives on decision making, are more risk-averse, and are communicative in
solving problems (Bernardi & Arnold, 1997; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Price, 2012;
Cumming et al., 2015). Bernile et al. (2018) show that board gender diversity affects
corporate policies as reflected in better corporate performance. Hence, female
directors can be better at representing shareholder interests, especially the minority
shareholders, as well as balancing the interest of all stakeholders. Therefore, the
presence of a female board member serves as a governance mechanism that reduces
agency problems. On the other hand, the literature also shows that dividend has
been used as an effective tool to reduce agency problems (La Porta et al., 2000),
while dividend decisions, like other strategic firm decisions, are decided by BODs,
who are expectedly representing the best interest of the shareholders. This article
explores board gender diversity and its impact on firms’ dividend policy in an
emerging country, Indonesia.
Indonesia is a predominantly patriarchal society, except in a few communities
(AIPEG, 2017). Indonesia’s population is also an overwhelmingly Muslim, by
religious affiliation, which heavily influences socio-cultural life in the country
(Sakai & Fauzia 2016). Islamic doctrine holds that women’s place is in the home,
whereas men are responsible for work outside the home, which is reflected in
Indonesia’s Family Law (1974). In Indonesian culture, the social norm is that the
husband provides for his wife and the family, although it is socially acceptable
for women to be involved in informal economic activity. Therefore, under all
circumstances, women should not lead men. In Indonesia, women have more
difficulty than men in getting a job, and they have less access to more lucrative
positions and receive on average about 70 percent of the men’s wages in the
formal sector and 50 percent in the informal sector (AIPEG, 2017). A policy brief
on gender equality by the Ministry of National Development Planning and the
Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection of Indonesia (2011)
shows that women’s participation in the formal economy is mostly limited by their
traditional role in taking care of the family at home, poor access to formal sector
employment, culturally defined expectations of appropriate work for women,
and discriminatory practices at work. That being the case, the effect of women’s
presence on the firm board will possibly have an impact on dividend payment
in the Indonesian context that is likely different from what has been found in the
previous studies.
1

See OECD.Stat (https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54753/).

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss0/7
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v24i0

2

Rifandy et al.: WOMEN IN A DUAL BOARD SYSTEM AND DIVIDEND POLICY
Women In a Dual Board System and Dividend Policy

131

Moreover, the investigation of the nexus between female’s presence and
dividend policy is important because only a few studies examine how female
directors influence dividend policies. For instance, Byoun et al. (2016), Chen et al.
(2017), and Benjamin and Biswas (2019) focused on the US firms, but these firms
have a one-tiered system. In such a system, both managerial and supervisory
functions are in a unified board. Consequently, the issue of CEO duality exists
and might reduce the role of monitoring. In this case, female directors play an
essential role in reducing the adverse effects of CEO duality, as female directors
are considered to have more monitoring capacity (Wang et al., 2019). For dividend
policy, the aforementioned studies found a positive relationship between female
directors and dividend payments, which is an example of female directors
promoting better corporate governance in the context of CEO duality issue.
This paper is also different from prior empirical works because, unlike firms
in most countries, Indonesian firms have a two-tiered system, with both a board of
commissioners (BOC) and a BOD. This system, regulated by the Limited Liability
Law (2007), explicitly separates the role of executives and non-executives. This
mechanism differs from a one-tiered system in which executives hold a position
on the board. Therefore, CEO duality (or CEOs who are also BOD chairs) does
not exist in Indonesia, which implies that female directors’ role in dividend policy
in a two-tiered system might be different, depending on which board they serve.
Nevertheless, investigating women’s role in the two-tier system will be more
complicated as it will have to cover the boards in both tiers, the supervisory
and the managerial or executive function; the question then is in which roles or
functions do women contribute more to dividend policy? To answer this question,
this article investigates the impact of gender diversity among both commissioners
and directors on dividend payment policy. Meanwhile, few studies have been
conducted on female directors in a two-tiered system (Pucheta-Martínez &
Bel-Oms 2015), especially in developing countries, where, despite significant
economic growth, female participation in the labor force is relatively low, as is the
level of gender diversity on BODs (Darmadi, 2010; 2011). Saeed and Sameer (2017)
examined the issue for developing countries with a two-tiered system, but their
cross-country study does not investigate the two types of boards separately. In
addition, different cultural and ethical environments affect gender roles in general
(Amore et al., 2014; Deng, 2015; Cho et al., 2019).
To see how women’s presence on Indonesian firms’ boards affects dividend
policy, we use a sample of 525 publicly listed firms in Indonesia between 2011 and
2018. We define dividend policy in terms of both the amount of cash dividends and
the propensity to pay dividends, following prior studies such as Fama and French
(2001), Francis et al. (2011), Dewasiri et al. (2019), and Ye et al. (2019). Regarding
the female presence on the board, we separately investigate women’s roles in the
BOD and BOC, because the executive and non-executive roles in the Indonesian
two-tier system are explicitly separated. Following Gul et al. (2011), Ye et al. (2019),
and Chen et al. (2017), women’s presence is proxied by the number of female board
members, the natural logarithm of the number of female board members plus one,
and the proportion of female board members. Several control variables are also
introduced in this study to avoid omitted variable bias.

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021

3

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 24, No. 0 [2021], Art. 7
132

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking,
Volume 24, 14th BMEB Call for Papers Special Issue (2021)

In this paper, we also investigate the role of female directors in the familyowned businesses with a dual board structure, which is also unexplored in the
literature. In Indonesia, most listed firms are controlled by a family (Claessens et
al., 2000), whereby board members are usually appointed by the head of the family
to ensure their interests are protected (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010). Therefore,
trusted family members commonly serve as board members, in either the executive
or supervisory function, or both. In such a context, understanding whether or not
the positive attribute of female directors persist is crucial, considering businesses
in Asian countries follow the social value and preserve the role of gender (Yan &
Sorenson, 2004; Deng, 2015).
Our empirical evidence suggests that female commissioners’ presence is
not related to dividend policy, while the existence of female directors in a firm
has a negative effect on dividend payment. These results suggest that women
have a greater role in firms’ dividend policy if they have a role as an executive.
More specifically, female directors have a precautionary motive to lower cash
dividend distribution to retain more cash on hand as a buffer for unpredictable
situations in the future. Prior studies also report that female directors are not as
confident as male directors when making corporate decisions (Huang & Kisgen,
2013) and are less risk-tolerant than male board members (Levi et al., 2014). In the
subsequent analysis, however, female commissioners are negatively associated
with cash dividend payment at family-controlled firms but not at non-familycontrolled firms. This finding suggests that female commissioners are actively
involved in cash dividend decisions at family-controlled firms, indicating that
female commissioners prefer to have more buffers to ensure the family-controlled
business’s long-term sustainability (Prencipe et al., 2011). Overall, our result
supports prior studies, such as Saeed and Sameer (2017), suggesting a different
dividend policy in an emerging country with high business risk, a more volatile
stock market, and high inflation.
This paper offers a significant contribution to the literature because, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the role of gender in promoting
dividend payment and reducing agency conflicts in firms in developing countries
with a two-tiered system. Most prior empirical studies are conducted using
samples from developed countries with a one-tiered system, such as Russia (Saeed
and Sameer, 2017) and Spain (Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2015). Other studies
either examine emerging countries, such as Sri Lanka (Dewasiri et al., 2019) and
India (Sanan, 2019) or a worldwide sample of countries (Benjamin and Biswas,
2019; Chen et al., 2017; Ye et al., 2019). However, an empirical study using a sample
from a single country could capture the phenomena that cannot be observed
by using samples from multiple countries. This study also provides empirical
evidence on the separate impacts of supervisory and executive roles on corporate
strategic decisions such as dividend policy. Most prior studies focus on the impact
of female directors on financial performance and only a few studies examine the
impact on dividend policies. Again, the few existing papers, such as Byoun et al.
(2016), Chen et al. (2017), and Benjamin and Biswas (2019), focus on US firms with
a one-tiered system, but little empirical research has been done on a two-tiered
system.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss0/7
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the
hypotheses. Section III describes the research method, the sample selection, and
empirical models. Section IV presents the results and robustness checks. Section
V concludes.
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The literature on corporate governance suggests that dividends are an effective
tool for managing agency conflicts, particularly free-cash-flow problems, between
managers and shareholders as well as between majority and minority shareholders
(Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). La Porta et al. (2000) and Brockman
and Unlu (2009) provide empirical evidence that investor protection matters in
shaping firms’ dividend policies around the world. In the same spirit, Bøhren et
al. (2012), Ngo et al. (2018), and Balachandran et al. (2019) find that controlling
shareholders tend to use dividend policy to mitigate conflicts with minority
shareholders. In studying female directors, Kang et al. (2010) provide evidence
that women place more interest in protecting shareholders, a finding that is
recently supported by Srinidhi et al. (2020), who show that the presence of female
board members is beneficial to firm governance. The positive impact of women’s
presence on boards is possibly because they have distinct characteristics compared
to their men colleagues that could enhance strategic decision-making, particularly
at the top of the corporate hierarchy. According to Adams and Funk (2012), female
directors care more about benevolence and stimulation. On the other hand, male
directors are more achievement- and power-oriented than the female Adams (2016).
This evidence is consistent with some empirical works suggesting that women
generally exhibit less willingness than men to engage in competitive activities and
men, in contrast, have better performance when subject to competitive pressure
(Amore et al., 2014). Therefore, if some of these distinct values are combined in
a board, they could complement each other. Female commissioners also tend to
pay more attention to the welfare of shareholders (Liu, 2018) and this could be an
implementation of the benevolence value. Because the role of women in Indonesia,
particularly in the firm and in the government, is also increasing, we posit that.
H1: In a two-tiered system, females’ presence on the board of commissioners is positively
associated with dividend payment policy.
The top management team’s composition can be a signal to investors regarding
a firm’s future performance (Quintana-García & Benavides-Velasco, 2016). Unlike
with diversity among commissioners, we argue that the gender diversity in the
board of directors’ membership will have a negative impact on the dividend
payment policy of a firm because the literature provides evidence that women are
more risk-averse and have lower overconfidence than men. Appointing woman
executives can reduce the likelihood of excessive risk-taking, since women are more
likely to show risk aversion in financial decisions (Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998),
leading to less risky corporate outcomes (Adams, 2016). Levi et al. (2014) document
that more gender-diverse boards are associated with lower deal initiation activity,
implying that more diverse boards are less overconfident. A top management team
with more female representation also exhibits more conservative behaviour than
a non-diverse team (Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015). Consequently, female directors
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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tend to hold on to more excess cash flow by not paying dividends because they
are afraid of unstable future financial conditions (Saeed & Sameer, 2017). Huang
and Kisgen (2013) report that female executives make fewer investment decisions
than male executives. Although some prior studies report that female executives
have significantly higher financial performance, this occurs only in markets with
low competition (Amore and Garofalo, 2016). Moreover, in a Muslim-majority
population such as in Indonesia, women’s presence might not be accepted in all
fields and it could decrease the willingness of women to make risky decisions in the
organization they participate in. Subsequently, we hypothesize that their presence
among top-level management or BODs will deteriorate the firm’s decision-making
process, including dividend payments. That is,
H2: In a two-tiered system, females’ presence on the board of directors is negatively
associated with dividend payment policy.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data and sample
We use a sample of listed companies in Indonesia from 2011 to 2018. The sample
period is restricted to 2011–2018 to avoid the crisis period that could have changed
firms’ behavior towards their dividend policies. Our data come from the OSIRIS
database and the Indonesian Capital Market Directory. We take all firms available
from the database as our sample, since we observe dividend policies that are more
driven by the controlling shareholders rather than stock liquidity. Following prior
research on dividend policy (Fama & French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Von
Eije & Megginson, 2008; Chen et al., 2017), we exclude financial firms from the
sample, as they are heavily regulated and thus might behave differently in terms of
dividend policy. Our final unbalanced panel datasets consist of 3,365 observations
on 525 non-financial listed firms in Indonesia.
B. Methodology
To examine the effect of board gender diversity on dividend policy, we use the
following regressions as our baseline model.

(1)

(2)

where Div/TA is the ratio of cash dividends to total assets (in percentage) for
firm i at time t, and DDivi,t is a dummy for paying dividends at time t. FBCi,t and
FBDi,t measure the female board commissioners and directors of firm i at time t
respectively. Cki,t is control variables k of firm i at time t. These control variables
are, among others, Ln TA, ROA, Growth TA, Leverage, DFamily, and Cash/TA.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss0/7
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We define dividend policy in terms of both the amount of cash dividends and
the propensity to pay dividends. Following Fama and French (2001), Dewasiri et
al. (2019), and Ye et al. (2019), we use a dummy variable for the propensity to pay
dividends, which takes a value of one if a firm pays dividends (DDiv) and zero
otherwise. Following Francis et al. (2011), we also use the ratio of cash dividends
scaled by total assets (Div/TA), rather than the ratio of dividends to earnings, to
measure the amount of cash dividends paid. This approach avoids having a ratio
of dividends to net income that exceeds one (or 100%).
The main independent variable is female board members in a two-tiered board
system, to measure gender diversity on the two types of board; that is, female
members of the board of commissioners (FBC) and female members of the board
of director (FBD). Following Gul et al. (2011) and Ye et al. (2019), we use the number
of female board members and the natural logarithm of the number of female board
members plus one (Ln(number of female board members + 1)), to avoid missing
values if there is no female board member (zero). Following Chen et al. (2017), we
also measure gender diversity as the proportion of female board members.
To avoid omitted variable bias, we include several control variables in our
empirical model. First, following Fama and French (2001), we include firm size,
measured by the logarithm of total assets (Ln TA),2 profitability, measured by
return on assets (ROA), and firm growth, measured by the annual growth of
total assets (Growth TA). Second, as the literature provides strong empirical
evidence that dividend policy follows firms’ life cycle (DeAngelo et al., 2006; Von
Eije & Megginson, 2008; Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; Brawn & Šević, 2018; Wardhana
& Tandelilin, 2018), we use firm age as a proxy for the firm life cycle. A third
control added to the model is leverage (LEV), measured as the ratio of total debt to
total assets, as creditors might limit the dividend payout in order to protect their
interest in a firm (Cao et al., 2017; Lepetit et al., 2018). Fourth, we add ownership
variables as abundant empirical studies show that it matters in dividend decisions
(Grinstein & Michaely, 2005; Bøhren et al., 2012; Lacave & Urtiaga, 2015; Mulyani
et al., 2016). We include this variable in the Indonesian context, in which family
ownership is dominant (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005; Bøhren et al., 2012; Lacave
& Urtiaga, 2015; Mulyani et al., 2016). So, the ownership variable (DFamily) is
included in the model to indicate whether a family controls a firm. Last, following
DeAngelo et al. (2006), we include cash on hand as a firm’s ability to pay dividends
can be observed directly with the level of cash on hand. To measure cash on hand,
in this paper, we use the ratio of cash divided by total assets (Cash/TA).
The Equation (1) is estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. In Equation
(2), in which the dependent variable is binary, we use a logit regression with
random-effects and industry-fixed effects, following Von Eije and Megginson
(2008) and Wardhana and Tandelilin (2018), to investigate the impact of gender
diversity on the propensity to pay dividends. Regarding endogeneity issues of
our main variable, we perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) (Durbin, 1954;
Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) test to see whether FBC and FBD are endogenous.
Following Chen et al. (2017), our first instrument is female participation to male
2

We use the growth of assets instead of the market-to-book value to avoid potential endogeneity
issues between firm value and dividends as dividends affect firm value.
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participation. The higher the female participation to male ratio in the labor force,
the higher the chance for a firm to get a good female candidate as a director or
a commissioner (Chen et al., 2017). Therefore, the female participation to male
ratio will have a positive correlation with the number or the proportion of female
directors/commissioners. The data on labor participation is retrieved from the
World Bank database. Another instrument we use in this paper is the lagged value
of total boards. According to Anderson and Hsiao (1981), the lagged value of the
instrumented variable is highly correlated with the instrumented variable but not
with the error term at time. Therefore, the lag value of the instrumented variable
is also a suitable instrument.
The DWH test shows a chi-squared of 1.533 with a p-value of 0.212, indicating
that the number of FBC and FBD is not endogenous. The instruments pass the
weak instrument test with Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F-statistics of 55.22 over 11.04
of the lowest Stock–Yogo critical value (11.04). The instruments are also valid,
with a p-value from Hansen J-statistics of 0.212. Therefore, we proceed with the
estimations using fixed-effects and logit regression.3
IV. RESULTS
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study after
winsorizing extreme values at 1 percent and 99 percent.4 Table 2 shows that
Indonesian firms, on average, pay cash dividends of 1.5 percent of their total assets.
Only 44 percent of the firms pay cash dividends over the sample period. This is
less than in previous years, as shown by Wardhana and Tandelilin (2018), with
seventeen years of observations ending in 2011, when 50 percent of the firms paid
dividends. Therefore, the trend toward paying smaller dividends in Indonesia is
consistent with patterns seen at firms around the world in recent empirical studies
(Fatemi & Bildik, 2012).
Regarding board gender diversity, Table 1 reports that 34 percent of the firms
have female commissioners (DFBC), and 53 percent of the firms have female board
directors (DFBD). Figure 1 shows the trends in the relevant variables over our
sample period (i.e. from 2011 to 2018). The amount of cash dividend payments
(ratio of cash dividends scaled by total assets) declined over the sample period,
although it increased after 2016. The proportion of female board members rises
over the sample period, indicating a negative association between cash dividends
paid and female board members’ proportion. To further investigate the causal
relationship between women on board and dividend policy considering firm
individual heterogeneity, we use regression estimations in the next section.

3

4

In the case of potential reverse causality, we argue that the firm’s cash dividends do not influence
female board members’ number or proportion. We suspect that our female board variable is not
endogenous in this case. Yet, we take more precaution by testing the presence of endogeneity.
For variable leverage (LEV), we reduce values larger than 100.
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Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics of Variables, 2011-2018
This table has descriptive statistics. Div/TA = Dividend*100/Total Assets. DDiv is a dummy that equals to one if the
firm pays dividends. FBC is the number of female members of the board of commissioners (BoC), FBD is the number
of female members of the board of directors (BoD). FBC (%) and FBD (%) is the proportion of females on the BoC
and BoD, respectively. DFBC and DFBD is dummy variable that equals one if there is female member of the BoC and
BoD, respectively. ROA is Net income*100/Total assets. LEV is Debt*100/Total assets. DFamily is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the firm is controlled by a family, where one or more BoC or BoD members come from the
same family whose aggregate ownership is more than 10%. Age is firm age. TA is total assets. Cash/TA computed as
Cash*100/Total assets. Growth TA is yearly growth of assets in percent.

Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Div/TA
DDiv
FBC
FBD
FBC (%)
FBD (%)
DFBC
DFBD
ROA
LEV
DFamily
Age
Total assets (million USD)
Cash/TA
Growth TA

3,365
3,365
3,365
3,365
3,360
3,363
3,365
3,365
3,365
3,365
3,365
3,365
3,365
3,365
3,365

1.550
0.447
0.437
0.583
11.332
12.792
0.338
0.412
3.084
48.957
0.290
30.053
629,860
9.388
14.174

3.932
0.497
0.718
0.855
18.512
18.093
0.473
0.492
11.501
23.778
0.454
16.709
1,507,212
10.358
61.604

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-51.234
2.44
0
1
159
0.055
-48.635

25.661
1
6
8
100
100
1
1
39.727
99.73
1
113
23,800,000
52.265
541.491

Figure 1.
Trends in Female Board of Commissioners, Directors, and Cash Dividends
(2011-2018)
This figure shows the trend in female board of commissioners, directors, and cash dividends over the period from
2011 to 2018. FBC and FBD denote, respectively, the proportion of female board commissioners and directors, while
Div/TA is cash dividends scaled by total assets.
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2016

2017

2018

9

FBC
FBD
Ln FBC
Ln FBD
FBC (%)
FBD (%)
ROA
LEV
DFamily
Ln Age
Ln TA
Cash/TA
Growth TA

1
0.128
0.971
0.105
0.862
0.095
0.029
-0.012
0.131
0.038
0.045
-0.013
0.007

1

1
0.124
0.965
0.089
0.860
0.083
-0.046
0.013
0.015
0.052
0.100
-0.010

2

1
0.109
0.903
0.099
0.018
-0.005
0.123
0.022
0.043
-0.028
0.007

3

1
0.076
0.901
0.071
-0.042
0.013
-0.011
0.036
0.088
-0.009

4

1
0.100
-0.019
-0.015
0.095
-0.043
-0.082
-0.043
0.034

5

1
0.040
-0.076
-0.005
-0.042
-0.119
0.073
-0.009

6

1
-0.182
0.007
0.095
0.142
0.273
0.068

7

1
-0.029
-0.098
-0.072
-0.180
0.055

8

1
0.090
0.028
-0.029
-0.052

9

1
0.137
0.030
-0.153

10

1
0.006
-0.04

11

1
0.073

12

1

13

138

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

This table contains the correlation matrix. FBC is the number of female members of the board of commissioners (BoC), FBD is the number of female members of the board of directors
(BoD). FBC (%) and FBD (%) is the proportion of females on the BoC and BoD, respectively. DFBC and DFBD is dummy variable that equals one if there is female member of the BoC
and BoD, respectively. ROA is Net income*100/Total assets. LEV is Debt*100/Total assets. DFamily is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm is controlled by a family,
where one or more BoC or BoD members come from the same family whose aggregate ownership is more than 10%. Ln Age is natural logarithm of firm age. Ln TA is natural logarithm
of firms’ total assets. Cash/TA computed as Cash*100/Total assets. Growth TA is yearly growth of assets in percent.

Table 2.
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables
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We also provide a matrix of correlation in Table 2 to show the absence of
potential multicollinearity issues among the independent variables.
B. Baseline Result
Table 3 presents our baseline results. In columns 1 and 2, we use the number of
female board members and its log value, respectively, while in column 3 we use
the proportion of female members of each board. We use a fixed-effects estimator
for the cash dividend estimation to address individual fixed effects. The Hausman
test shows that the fixed-effects model is best for our data. We use a panel data
logit regression alongside a random-effects regression for the propensity to pay
dividends, following Von Eije and Megginson (2008). To minimize individual
effects, we include industry-fixed effects in our logit regression.
Table 3.
Baseline: Fixed Effects Regression Female Board Members on Dividends, 2011-2018
This table has fixed-effects regression results. The dependent variable is Div/TA = Cash dividends*100/Total assets.
FBC is the number of female members of the board of commissioners (BoC), FBD is the number of female members of
the board of directors (BoD). FBC (%) and FBD (%) is the proportion of females on the BoC and BoD, respectively. Ln
FBC and Ln FBD is natural logarithm of FBC and FBD, respectively. ROA is Net income*100/Total assets. L.LEV is lag
of Debt*100/Total assets. DFamily is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm is controlled by a family,
where one or more BoC or BoD members come from the same family whose aggregate ownership is more than 10%.
Ln Age is the natural logarithm of firm age. Ln TA is natural logarithm of the firms’ total assets. Cash/TA computed as
Cash*100/Total assets. Growth TA is yearly growth of assets in percent. Robust standard error clustered by firm are in
parentheses. Finally, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Div/TA
FBC
FBD

(1)

(2)

0.150
(0.168)
-0.498**
(0.247)

Ln FBC
Ln FBD
FBC (%)
FBD (%)
ROA
L.LEV
DFamily
Ln Age
Ln TA
Cash/TA

(3)

0.0527
(0.0919)
-0.270**
(0.122)

0.0405***
(0.00813)
-0.0172***
(0.00482)
-0.725**
(0.335)
1.435**
(0.679)
-0.156*
(0.0936)
0.0130
(0.0109)

0.0405***
(0.00813)
-0.0172***
(0.00483)
-0.720**
(0.333)
1.449**
(0.680)
-0.158*
(0.0935)
0.0130
(0.0109)
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0.00328
(0.00379)
-0.00903
(0.00568)
0.0403***
(0.00809)
-0.0164***
(0.00458)
-0.725**
(0.332)
1.463**
(0.678)
-0.160*
(0.0926)
0.0127
(0.0109)
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Table 3.
Baseline: Fixed Effects Regression Female Board Members on Dividends, 2011-2018
(Continued)
Div/TA
Growth TA
Cons
Year FE
No. of obs.
No. of groups
R-Squared Within
F-stat

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.00150**
(0.000726)
0.209
(2.297)
Yes
3365
525
0.0562
3.573***

-0.00151**
(0.000726)
0.201
(2.298)
Yes
3365
525
0.0563
3.651***

-0.00157**
(0.000726)
0.0833
(2.286)
Yes
3358
524
0.0551
3.509***

The main message from Table 3 is that female commissioners (FBC) do not
seem to be related to the amount of cash dividend payments. These results are
consistent, whether we use the number of females on the board (FBD or FBC)
or its log value (Ln FBD or Ln FBC). However, the number of female directors
(FBD) is negatively related to cash dividend payments, implying that a higher
number of women directors tend to decrease dividend payments. Meanwhile, the
coefficient for the proportion of female board members (FBD (%) or FBC (%)) is
not statistically significant. We assume that this is due to the tiny within variation
of the proportion of female board members variable. We compute the mean of the
within variance of both the proportion of FBC and FBD and find the value is nearly
zero. Overall, at this point, our baseline estimates show that a higher number of
female members on the executive board tends to decrease cash dividend payments
and that FBD has a more significant role in dividend policy decisions than FBC.
These findings do not support our first hypothesis that in a country with weak
investor protection, a high dividend payment mitigates agency conflicts, and thus
female board members, who pay greater attention to shareholder interests, tend to
encourage higher dividend payments.
However, the finding on the relationship between FBD and dividend
payments, overall, supports our second hypothesis that female directors have a
negative effect on dividend payment. In column 1 of Table 3, we observe that one
additional female director is associated with a decline in dividends scaled by total
assets (Div/TA) by 0.27%. This decline is relatively significant, since the sample
mean of Div/TA is 1.55%, with a standard deviation of 3.93%. Empirical studies
find that female directors are not as overconfident as male directors when making
corporate decisions (Huang & Kisgen, 2013) and are less risk-tolerant than male
board members (Levi et al., 2014). In this case, female directors prefer to hold on
to more cash, hence, paying smaller cash dividends for a precautionary motive.
This result supports Saeed and Sameer (2017) findings that, in an emerging
country, female directors have a precautionary motive in lowering cash dividend
distribution to retain more cash on hand as a buffer for rainy days in the future.
This argument is appropriate in an emerging country with high business risk, a
more volatile stock market, and high inflation, such as Indonesia.
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The effect of female board members on a firm’s propensity to pay dividends is
reported in Table 4. We find no evidence that female board members, whether FBC
or FBD, influence the tendency to pay dividends.
Table 4.
Baseline: Random-Effects Logit Regression Female Board Members on Dividends,
2011-2018
This table has random effects logit regression results with industry-fixed effects. The dependent variable is DDiv or a
dummy variable that equals to one if the firm pays dividends. FBC is the number of female members of the board of
commissioners (BoC), FBD is the number of female members of the board of directors (BoD). FBC (%) and FBD (%)
is the proportion of females on the BoC and BoD, respectively. Ln FBC and Ln FBD is natural logarithm of FBC and
FBD, respectively. ROA is Net income*100/Total assets. L.LEV is lag of Debt*100/Total assets. DFamily is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the firm is controlled by a family, where one or more BoC or BoD members come
from the same family whose aggregate ownership is more than 10%. Ln Age is the natural logarithm of firm age. Ln
TA is natural logarithm of the firms’ total assets. Cash/TA computed as Cash*100/Total assets. Growth TA is yearly
growth of assets in percent. Standard error in parentheses, with observed information matrix standard error. Finally,
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

DDiv
Ln FBC
Ln FBD

(1)

(2)

0.393
(0.281)
0.298
(0.255)

FBC (%)
FBD (%)
DFBC
DFBD
ROA
L.LEV
DFamily
Ln Age
Ln TA
Cash/TA
Growth TA
Cons
Industry FE
No. of obs.
No. of groups
Log likelihood

(3)

0.314*
(0.162)
0.130
(0.136)

0.0930***
(0.0117)
-0.0349***
(0.00578)
0.253
(0.326)
0.963***
(0.274)
1.250***
(0.119)
0.0421***
(0.0113)
-0.00593***
(0.00194)
-16.51***
(1.876)
Yes
3365
525
-1181.7

0.0933***
(0.0117)
-0.0349***
(0.00578)
0.265
(0.326)
0.968***
(0.273)
1.251***
(0.119)
0.0417***
(0.0113)
-0.00590***
(0.00194)
-16.54***
(1.874)
Yes
3365
525
-1182.3
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0.00630
(0.00636)
0.00976
(0.00619)
0.0930***
(0.0117)
-0.0350***
(0.00580)
0.252
(0.327)
1.003***
(0.275)
1.287***
(0.120)
0.0415***
(0.0113)
-0.00583***
(0.00194)
-17.05***
(1.902)
Yes
3358
524
-1180.3
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In the baseline results in Table 3, the control variables support the previous
findings, hence, supporting the dividend life-cycle hypothesis, as in Wardhana
and Tandelilin (2018). We find that firm age and profitability have a positive
relationship with dividend payments, whereas growth has a negative one. As for
the propensity to pay dividends, reported in Table 4, we also find that firm age,
profitability, and size positively affect the propensity to pay dividends, but growth
has a negative impact. Our other finding suggests that leverage has a negative
impact on both cash dividends and the propensity to pay them, supporting Jensen
(1986). In contrast, family-owned firms tend to pay lower dividends and have a
lower propensity to pay dividends, which confirms existing empirical evidence
such as Bøhren et al. (2012) and Mulyani et al. (2016).
C. Further Analysis
Motivated by the predominance of Indonesian family-controlled firms, we
investigate whether family-controlled firms, which typically appoint family
members as board members to ensure their interest in the firms (Yoshikawa &
Rasheed, 2010), influence the relationship between female board members and
dividend policy decisions. Another distinct characteristic of Asian listed firms
is concentrated ownership and a pyramidal ownership structure (Faccio et al.,
2001), which lead to expropriation by minority shareholders. In Indonesia, familycontrolled businesses as well as a pyramidal ownership structure are also dominant
(Claessens et al., 1999), and family-controlled firms’ market capitalization accounts
for about 40 percent of the Indonesian capital market (Mulyani et al., 2016). Our
sample shows that 30 percent of the non-financial firms are family-run businesses.
Hence, we further investigate the role of FBC and FBD in dividend policy in family
businesses. We do this by introducing the interaction variables FBC*Family and
FBD*Family in the regressions and report the results in Tables 5 and 6 for cash
dividends and the propensity to pay them, respectively.
Table 5.
Interaction: Fixed-Effects Regression Female Board Members on Dividends by
Family Ownership, 2011-2018
This table has fixed-effects regression results. The dependent variable is Div/TA = Cash dividends*100/Total assets.
Ln FBC is the natural logarithm of the number of female members of the board of commissioners (BoC) and Ln FBD
is natural logarithm of the number of female members of the board of directors (BoD). FBC (%) and FBD (%) is the
proportion of females on the BoC and BoD, respectively. DFBC and DFBD is dummy variables of FBC and FBD,
respectively. DFamily is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is controlled by a family. Robust standard errors
clustered by the firms are in parentheses. Finally, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

FBC
FBC*Family
FBD
FBD*Family

(1)
Ln FBC or Ln FBD

(2)
FBC (%) or FBD (%)

(3)
DFBC or DFBD

0.190
(0.118)
-0.439**
(0.205)
-0.365**
(0.149)
0.338*
(0.203)

0.368*
(0.212)
-0.766**
(0.349)
-0.729**
(0.298)
0.901**
(0.380)

0.00719
(0.00504)
-0.0172
(0.0106)
-0.0130*
(0.00703)
0.0177**
(0.00847)
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Table 5.
Interaction: Fixed-Effects Regression Female Board Members on Dividends by
Family Ownership, 2011-2018 (Continued)

Year FE
Controls
No. of obs.
No. of groups
R-Squared Within
F-stat

(1)
Ln FBC or Ln FBD

(2)
FBC (%) or FBD (%)

(3)
DFBC or DFBD

Yes
Yes
3365
525
0.0588
3.229***

Yes
Yes
3365
525
0.0600
3.291***

Yes
Yes
3358
524
0.0579
3.158***

Table 6.
Interaction: Random-Effects Logit Regression Female Board Members on
Dividends by Family, 2011-2018
This table has random-effects logit regression results with industry-fixed effects. The dependent variable is DDiv or a
dummy variable that equals to one if the firm pays dividends. Ln FBC is the natural logarithm of the number of female
members of the board of commissioners (BoC) and Ln FBD is natural logarithm of the number of female members
of the board of directors (BoD). FBC (%) and FBD (%) is the proportion of females on the BoC and BoD, respectively.
DFBC and DFBD is dummy variables of FBC and FBD, respectively. DFamily is a dummy variable that equals one if
firm is controlled by a family. z statistics are in parentheses, with observed information matrix standard error. Finally,
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

FBC
FBC*Family
FBD
FBD*Family
Industry FE
Controls
No. of obs.
No. of groups
Log likelihood

(1)
Ln FBC or Ln FBD

(2)
FBC (%) or FBD (%)

(3)
DFBC or DFBD

0.497**
(2.55)
-0.573*
(-1.81)
0.0150
(0.09)
0.444
(1.51)
Yes
Yes
3365
525
-1178.8

0.718**
(2.16)
-1.134**
(-1.99)
0.0313
(0.10)
1.012*
(1.88)
Yes
Yes
3365
525
-1178.5

0.0133*
(1.84)
-0.0266**
(-2.09)
0.00715
(0.99)
0.0120
(0.91)
Yes
Yes
3358
524
-1177.7

In Table 5, FBC*Family is statistically significant with a negative sign for
the number of female board members (see columns (1) and (2)), but FBC is not
statistically significant. This indicates that a higher FBC is associated with a lower
cash dividend payment at family firms, but not at non-family-controlled firms. This
finding shows that female commissioners are actively involved in cash dividend
decisions at family-controlled firms, indicating that female commissioners prefer
to have more buffers to ensure the long-term sustainability of family-controlled
businesses (Prencipe et al., 2011).
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We find that the main effect, FBD, is negative and statistically significant at
the 5 percent level, especially for the number of FBD. Yet, FBD*Family appears
to be positive and significant, indicating that female directors are also involved
in cash dividend decisions at family-controlled firms. We then perform a Wald
test to evaluate the coefficient of the interaction term. The coefficient of FBD at
non-family-controlled firms is -0.729, indicating a negative effect of FBD on cash
dividend payouts, while for FBD at family-controlled firms, it is 0.172 (-0.729 +
0.901)5 but not statistically significant. This result indicates that FBD has a negative
association with cash dividend payments only in the non-family-controlled firms.
Table 6 shows the result for the propensity to pay dividends. The main effect
for FBC is positive and significant for the number of FBC (columns 2 and 3),
whereas the interaction term FBC*Family is negative and significant. This means we
observe different FBC effects on the propensity to pay dividends between the two
groups. We perform a Wald test in column 2 to see whether the impact of FBC on
family-controlled firms is significant; we find a coefficient of -0.416 (0.718 – 1.134)6.
However, this coefficient is not statistically significant, leading us to conclude that
female commissioners are involved in decisions to pay dividends at non-familycontrolled firms but not family-controlled firms. This result indicates that female
commissioners act on behalf of the minority shareholders by promoting dividend
payments to reduce agency conflicts between the majority and the minority
shareholders. This finding supports our first hypothesis, but only for non-familycontrolled firms. However, we do not find a significant coefficient in the main
effect and the interaction terms when considering FBD in our regression, so the
baseline result stands that FBD does not impact the propensity to pay dividends.
D. Robustness Checks
We perform a series of robustness tests to see whether our results are altered. To
save space, all the robustness checks are not shown. First, we estimate Equation
(1) using the Tobit regression estimator following the study of Francis et al. (2011),
Al-Malkawi et al. (2014), Jiang et al. (2019), and Driver et al. (2020), which consider
that dividend payout are left-censored at zero. We find the results unchanged. We
also estimate Equation (2) using a Probit regression estimator with random and
industry fixed effects for robustness and document similar results.
In our sample, the number of firms with female board members is relatively
smaller compared to firms without female board members. The proportion of
firms with FBD in the sample is 33% while the proportion of firms with FBC is
41%. Therefore, we also use propensity score matching to have matching firms
to compare between the two groups (with vs. without female board members).
We use a logit regression to compute the propensity score. We use the model
DFC = f(number of total directors, ROA, lagged leverage, firm size, family firm
dummy, growth, and industry-fixed effects) and DFB = f(number of total directors,
5

6

To obtain the coefficient of variable FBD for family controlled firms, we add the coefficient of FBD
with the coefficient of FBD*Family, -0.729 + 0.901= 0.172.
To obtain the coefficient of variable FBC for family controlled firms, we add the coefficient of FBD
with the coefficient of FBD*Family, 0.718 – 1.134= 0.416.
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ROA, lagged leverage, firm size, family firm dummy, growth, and industry-fixed
effects). DFC is a dummy variable that takes value of one if a firm has female board
of commissioner and zero otherwise while DFB is a dummy variable that takes
value of one if a firm has female board of director and zero otherwise. The results
for cash dividends and the propensity to pay dividends remain unchanged.
We also run the estimations by excluding firms that pay no dividends as well
as test whether our results change by excluding utility firms because they are
heavily regulated as financial firms7. Again, our conclusions remain the same. We
also consider the initial level of dividend, which could explain firms’ dividend
policies.8 Firms that pay dividend in the past are more likely to pay dividends
in the future. We estimate Equation (2) with the initial dividend and we obtain
similar results as in the baseline.
V. CONCLUSION
This article examines the role of diversity, in terms of female board members,
on the dividend payment policy of listed firms in Indonesia, which has a twotiered board system. This governance system consists of two distinct layers: nonexecutives on the board of commissioners and executives on the board of directors.
The former is tasked with monitoring, while the latter ensures that firm decisions
and policies aimed at increasing shareholder wealth. Using various regression
approaches and control variables, we find that the presence of females on the board
of commissioners influence corporate dividend decisions. The involvement of
female commissioners is more notable in family-controlled firms, as they prevent
higher dividend distribution and thereby retain more cash as a buffer to ensure
business sustainability in these firms. We find a negative association between
female board of directors and dividend payments in both family-controlled
and non-family-controlled firms, indicating risk-aversion and precautionary
behavior of female directors. Nevertheless, female commissioners’ involvement
in cash dividend decisions appear only at non-family-controlled firms and only
in the amount of cash dividend payments, with a negative relationship. Further
investigation shows that the propensity to pay dividends is more determined by
female commissioners, with a positive influence, and in non-family-controlled
business only. We also conduct several robustness tests using a Tobit regression, a
probit regression, as well as propensity score matching, and we arrive at the same
conclusions.
This study offers the insight that female board members in the two-tiered
Indonesian system might actively be involved in firms’ strategic decisions such
as the decision to pay or not to pay dividends. Using a sample of listed nonfinancial firms in Indonesia, we find a shred of evidence indicating that both
female commissioners and directors influence dividend policies but with different
roles and behavior that are contingent on firm ownership, i.e., family-controlled
vs. non-family-controlled firms. Future research should consider whether female
commissioners’ decisions at family-controlled firms to retain more earnings
7
8

We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
This was also suggested by an anonymous referee.
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are aligned with the interest of minority shareholders or whether the low cash
dividends result from better monitoring by female commissioners, which sends a
positive signal to minority shareholders.
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